A cura di Arminante Antonella, De Luca Melania, Gualtieri Teresa.
«Niente di quello che ho detto è vero, non perché non sia vero ma perché l’ho detto [1] ,
e viceversa
nothing of what I said is false, not because it is false but because I said so ".
e viceversa
nothing of what I said is false, not because it is false but because I said so ".
Emilio Garroni With these words in his essay Observations on the chin [2] , introduces us to the age-old debate about the relationship between truth and falsehood, between the honest and saying what is false .
Prior to the analysis of the issues addressed in the work, it is necessary to clarify the terminology to avoid misunderstanding: we do not speak of lies and truth in an absolute sense, but the terms truthful / truthful / veracity will be used meaning ' non-liar " or "who says what he believes to be true."
The aim of the author is to understand the common foundation of real-lie and lie literature. This is done through a reflection on similarities and contrasts that first examines the actual circumstances of lying, then to compare with what happens in the fiction that is created in the literary text. On the other hand, as pointed out by the same Garroni, "It would not be possible" literary liar "if there was a" liar realeo better, if somehow there was a condition of lying. "
In fact, you can observe a wide phenomenology of lying [1] : The liar social
built that is eager for approval, to integrate into the group mind. He wears a mask, and if someone puts in doubt his claims, belies desperation. It 'a person who tends to believe that his lies are not really lies, while being haunted by the suspicion that they might be really,
The liar and realistic policy, which assumes that all behave like him a liar, while declaring the 'opposite. It 'not so much worried that the others believe, but rather the fact that the lies will be successful. Accused, denies with other lies or half lies, The Liar
mundane, nonprofit, mind as mind, without necessarily practical purposes. If it is found even denied, can smile, insisting on the lie or candidly acknowledging he had lied, liar
The exiled by the company in society is infantile, anxious, restless and white at the same time. Mind and leaves almost always dangerous signs of their own lies to be discovered as a liar.
the light of the above, therefore, we can not explain the phenomenon of the lie and the liar with one intention, but we can identify a common characteristic: the trait of sociability.
and social practice to expose the lie. It also supports Oscar Wilde, in The decay of lying when he speaks of a mythical cavernicolo protobugiardo come del fondatore delle relazioni sociali e della società civile [2] : «il protobugiardo è senza dubbio il vero iniziatore dei rapporti sociali perché l’obiettivo del bugiardo è affascinare, procurare piacere e gioia. Costui incarna le radici della società civile». Egli, una sera, pur non essendo mai uscito dalla caverna per andare a caccia, quando tutti erano riuniti attorno al primo fuoco che mai si fosse acceso, si mise a raccontare di come avesse ucciso il più grosso dinosauro che mai uomo avesse ucciso e, alla richiesta di prove per quanto raccontava, si inventò l'improvviso arrivo di una squadriglia di pterodattili che con i loro artigli avevano sollevato la preda e l'avevano portava via, con ciò unendo frottola a frottola.
Questa capacità di creare qualcosa di simile alla realtà, ma allo stesso tempo di diverso, fonda i rapporti sociali; detto altrimenti, non è sufficiente la pura elaborazione, è necessario anche comunicare a qualcuno questa invenzione. Le motivazioni di tale gesto possono essere fondamentalmente due, ossia la bugia può esser detta per gioco (una bugia fine a se stessa) o per ottenere qualcosa di più (per ingannare). Nel primo caso si ha la dimensione letteraria, i romanzi, le avventure di personaggi inventati che vivono in un universo così vicino e allo stesso tempo lontano da quello della nostra realtà quotidiana. Il secondo è l'ambito dell'inganno per avere un vantaggio personale, un avere di più che la sola nostra dotazione naturale non sarebbe in grado di garantire [3] .
Il bugiardo, quindi, non può essere un solitario; è piuttosto il prototipo dell’uomo sociale: la menzogna corrisponde alle aspettative di chi la ascolta, anzi presuppone un “intelligenza” delle aspettative di verità di chi vuole ingannare. Solo se c’è da parte del bugiardo un autentico intus legere, ovvero un “leggere dentro” la mente della sua vittima, egli può sperare di essere creduto. Non c’è bugia senza comprensione dell’altro.
Inoltre non c’è bugia senza conoscenza della verità. Questa questione already found ample space in the pages of the Sophist of Plato when he says: "Vera is the proposition that says about you things as they are, while false is the one that tells you different things than they are. [...] (The false proposition) says things are, but other than those that are related to you. " The hoax, a lie is not nothing, but different. Only by keeping in mind the concepts of otherness and relation, the concept of lying is meaningful and genuine possibility of success. It is ironic but true: the lie, to be true, requires the assumption of the truth that the discourse of falsehood and are then denied it later. "The lie is a share (and betray, we add) the most general and specific conditions of truthfulness, "says Garroni.
You can even dare to say that truth is more related to the liar than the truthful. The true, in fact, truthful no matter what others think of what he says, and the consciousness of its truth defends him enough from any possible attack. The liar, however, not be contained within its own separate universe, no interest if other people believe or not, but at the same time choose to share and to betray the terms of the joint report, click twice.
addition, because the lie has to have a course, can not help it that within the language shared by the group, which is within the so-called language-context that the liar shares with the speech community in which it is inserted [4] .
Just as it needs to share with other language-context, the liar makes it the least possible changes that should not be perceived as such by others. The principle underlying it is the "minimal effort": the lie because they must be strong and effective offense is never sensational, and every new lie is supported by previous lies embedded in the language-shared context.
Actually no speech act is the pure and simple repetition of something already fully contained in a shared language-context: every speech act involves at least a small change in a given context or aspect, the meaning of a word or expression, etc. .. So, ironically, the truthful mind getting a little 'as it brings only minor variations in language, shared context, contributing to its preservation, processing, and the liar is always a little' truthful because, by making changes to the language-context contributes the same way as truthful to its preservation-transformation [5] .
This does not mean that true and false are the same thing. Indeed
statement sarà definita di volta in volta veritiera o menzognera rispetto a certe condizioni fattuali che standardizzano il contesto-linguaggio di riferimento. Ad esempio, nel caso in cui, in uno scambio comunicativo, si sia verificata un’incertezza o uno scarto nella comunicazione, si fa di solito richiesta di un chiarimento, di una precisazione, che possa essere d’aiuto nel ricollegare l’origine del misunderstanding ad una menzogna o semplicemente ad un comportamento linguistico non convenzionale.
L’individuazione di una bugia, dunque, implica una lunga e problematica procedura di riformulazione, esplicitazione e di espansione del contesto volta ad appurare se le variazioni apportate al linguaggio-contesto vengono via via portate alla luce o sono, invece, ostinatamente presentate dal nostro mendace interlocutore come non-variazioni, come pure e semplici repliche del già condiviso.
In sostanza, il bugiardo si configura, oltre che come prototipo dell’uomo sociale, anche come un conservatore: egli non si ferma neanche di fronte all’evidenza, in quanto tenta di far passare come già previste le variazioni da lui apportate, pur essendo queste ultime delle variazioni palesemente finalizzate a portare fuori strada l’interlocutore.
È evidente che la procedura di riformulazione di cui si è detto non è che la specificazione di ciò che è l’intenzione del parlante.
L’idea di intenzionalità sembrerebbe fungere da vera e propria ultima condizione, presumibilmente anche sufficiente, della possibilità del veritiero e del menzognero.
Se si vuole analizzare a fondo il tema dell’intenzionalità, non si può non prendere in considerazione la riflessione filosofica di Sant’Agostino che, pur ricollegandosi a questioni più strettamente teologiche, ci offre comunque degli spunti interessanti.
Per Agostino non tutte le falsità sono menzogne: è mendax colui che vuole ingannare, indipendentemente dalla veridicità delle sue parole. Il male non è nell’errore, ma nell’intenzione di voler fare credere ciò che si ritiene un errore, non nell’ingannarsi ma nell’ingannare. Ovvero la menzogna non is similar to the error.
Therefore, to arrive at a clear definition of the lie must necessarily take into account the factor of intentionality.
"It's not a liar who tells lies, because they could be mistaken, you may joke, can lead one to believe the false to the truth: Who is a liar and double voluntas, who wants to fool expressing, in words or by other means, something different from what he believes true, with the clear intention to pass off the fake real. " You mind, then, only if there is going to lie. Besides, who minds, as St. Augustine, has a heart duplex, a double heart, because pensa una cosa diversa da quella che dice: «ha un pensiero della cosa che sa o ritiene vera e che non dice, un altro di quella che sa o ritiene essere falsa e che dice al posto del primo. Da ciò deriva che si possa dire il falso senza mentire […] e che si possa dire il vero mentendo […]. È dunque dall’intenzione dell’animo e non dalla verità o falsità delle cosa in sé che bisogna giudicare se uno mente o non mente» [6] .
Nella valutazione che Sant’Agostino fa della menzogna, dunque, si realizza il passaggio da uno schema diadico (basato sulla struttura mente-parola) ad uno schema triadico (basato sulla struttura mente-volontà-parola) [7] .
Garroni, indicates a very different position, which, however, stressed that the intentions of our actions, linguistic or otherwise, are ephemeral and unfathomable, and therefore apparently represent only a sufficient condition of the possibility of true and false.
intentions, in fact, are never so clear, in fact they are always a little 'ambiguous, often multiple, sometimes embedded one inside the other like Chinese boxes. For example, you may knowingly lie about aspects of an issue deemed to be insignificant, in the belief that they are intentionally truthful to the essentials, conversely, it can be for a while being truthful to our accuracy conditioned by an intention on the other misleading that tends to mislead the other party [8] .
These reflections, arising from observation of everyday reality, are also confirmed in the literary, as claimed Garroni 'understanding of lies have a relationship with the literary work in general. "
If we examine the liars in literature, in this case we are not facing a "going out that" we can read directly in the text.
In fact, apart from specifying the author all the real conditions for which a given lie is a lie, and even explicitly attributed to a character the intention of lying, the ambiguity and instability, which we previously referred, tend to persist [9] .
is true, in fact, that a character can be attributed intentions, but in reality he, as a character, not intentions, the author is simply a loan, often only in specific situations, not to stretch the overall context of the work .
ambiguity and lies, on the other hand, are essentially the inherent characteristics of the language: there seems reason to suspect that the lie is part of the talk itself. It is in this sense that we find the analogy between real and literary lie lie. Eco says: "There is no language where lies" [10] .
contrast, the literary lie differs from the real lie, as in the opera lacks the good will of the speakers "which allows, in fact, to limit and control the ambiguity just enough for the purposes of speaking and communicating. In reality, the procedures for drafting the context shall continue until such time as the speakers to reach an agreement and are satisfied, in a literary text that is not possible. This implies that if the character is a liar, he is in so far as it says and it is specified, no more than one measure: are not possible expansions of the language-context, that is ideally infinite integrations on the same level of literary description.
However, being a liar a liar, because of its limitations, characterization is never final and final interpretative: it is a liar, be suspended in its finite but open to interpretation ideally infinite. Although, for example, a character often said the way the lies of a liar for calling, it would be wrong or at least misleading to interpret it more as a liar.
a literary character, and the work to which it belongs, therefore, be regarded as a set of speech acts that require a language-context shared (ie the language-context of the writing of a certain type of work in a certain historical moment), which can be changed more or less deeply. Hence the opportunity to take a further analogy between literature and lying: they both have similar underlying mechanisms of operation.
But compared to lies and not-lie (which, as we saw in the course of this work, assume the truth conditions and a common problem of determining intent), occurs in the literary thing as a real lack of distinction between truth and untruthfulness. The literary work is both truthful and untruthful, and therefore not strictly truthful, properly or misleading. In it, simply, occurs and manifests itself in an exemplary manner the building, bedding and changing context of a language-. Conditions are those in the literary expression of the true mean lying and saying that in reality they are indescribable, the work itself is, indeed, the actual outcome (ie explicit) understanding (which is implied) by the author what is true / not true.
In this brief journey through the real and literary falsehood we have seen how the universal and necessary condition of mind is precisely the same time the condition of being universal and necessary veridici. L’opera letteraria non fa altro che mettere esplicitamente sotto i nostri occhi questa duplicità, che è la prova dell’esistenza di una vera e propria vocazione alla menzogna; come dice Garroni: «vivere, fare, esperimentare, parlare, conoscere, pensare è sempre qualcosa che oscilla tra veridicità e menzogna, tra l’avere-a-che-fare-con-qualcosa e il farlo-passare-per-qualcosa-d’altro» [11] .
Prior to the analysis of the issues addressed in the work, it is necessary to clarify the terminology to avoid misunderstanding: we do not speak of lies and truth in an absolute sense, but the terms truthful / truthful / veracity will be used meaning ' non-liar " or "who says what he believes to be true."
The aim of the author is to understand the common foundation of real-lie and lie literature. This is done through a reflection on similarities and contrasts that first examines the actual circumstances of lying, then to compare with what happens in the fiction that is created in the literary text. On the other hand, as pointed out by the same Garroni, "It would not be possible" literary liar "if there was a" liar realeo better, if somehow there was a condition of lying. "
In fact, you can observe a wide phenomenology of lying [1] : The liar social
built that is eager for approval, to integrate into the group mind. He wears a mask, and if someone puts in doubt his claims, belies desperation. It 'a person who tends to believe that his lies are not really lies, while being haunted by the suspicion that they might be really,
The liar and realistic policy, which assumes that all behave like him a liar, while declaring the 'opposite. It 'not so much worried that the others believe, but rather the fact that the lies will be successful. Accused, denies with other lies or half lies, The Liar
mundane, nonprofit, mind as mind, without necessarily practical purposes. If it is found even denied, can smile, insisting on the lie or candidly acknowledging he had lied, liar
The exiled by the company in society is infantile, anxious, restless and white at the same time. Mind and leaves almost always dangerous signs of their own lies to be discovered as a liar.
the light of the above, therefore, we can not explain the phenomenon of the lie and the liar with one intention, but we can identify a common characteristic: the trait of sociability.
and social practice to expose the lie. It also supports Oscar Wilde, in The decay of lying when he speaks of a mythical cavernicolo protobugiardo come del fondatore delle relazioni sociali e della società civile [2] : «il protobugiardo è senza dubbio il vero iniziatore dei rapporti sociali perché l’obiettivo del bugiardo è affascinare, procurare piacere e gioia. Costui incarna le radici della società civile». Egli, una sera, pur non essendo mai uscito dalla caverna per andare a caccia, quando tutti erano riuniti attorno al primo fuoco che mai si fosse acceso, si mise a raccontare di come avesse ucciso il più grosso dinosauro che mai uomo avesse ucciso e, alla richiesta di prove per quanto raccontava, si inventò l'improvviso arrivo di una squadriglia di pterodattili che con i loro artigli avevano sollevato la preda e l'avevano portava via, con ciò unendo frottola a frottola.
Questa capacità di creare qualcosa di simile alla realtà, ma allo stesso tempo di diverso, fonda i rapporti sociali; detto altrimenti, non è sufficiente la pura elaborazione, è necessario anche comunicare a qualcuno questa invenzione. Le motivazioni di tale gesto possono essere fondamentalmente due, ossia la bugia può esser detta per gioco (una bugia fine a se stessa) o per ottenere qualcosa di più (per ingannare). Nel primo caso si ha la dimensione letteraria, i romanzi, le avventure di personaggi inventati che vivono in un universo così vicino e allo stesso tempo lontano da quello della nostra realtà quotidiana. Il secondo è l'ambito dell'inganno per avere un vantaggio personale, un avere di più che la sola nostra dotazione naturale non sarebbe in grado di garantire [3] .
Il bugiardo, quindi, non può essere un solitario; è piuttosto il prototipo dell’uomo sociale: la menzogna corrisponde alle aspettative di chi la ascolta, anzi presuppone un “intelligenza” delle aspettative di verità di chi vuole ingannare. Solo se c’è da parte del bugiardo un autentico intus legere, ovvero un “leggere dentro” la mente della sua vittima, egli può sperare di essere creduto. Non c’è bugia senza comprensione dell’altro.
Inoltre non c’è bugia senza conoscenza della verità. Questa questione already found ample space in the pages of the Sophist of Plato when he says: "Vera is the proposition that says about you things as they are, while false is the one that tells you different things than they are. [...] (The false proposition) says things are, but other than those that are related to you. " The hoax, a lie is not nothing, but different. Only by keeping in mind the concepts of otherness and relation, the concept of lying is meaningful and genuine possibility of success. It is ironic but true: the lie, to be true, requires the assumption of the truth that the discourse of falsehood and are then denied it later. "The lie is a share (and betray, we add) the most general and specific conditions of truthfulness, "says Garroni.
You can even dare to say that truth is more related to the liar than the truthful. The true, in fact, truthful no matter what others think of what he says, and the consciousness of its truth defends him enough from any possible attack. The liar, however, not be contained within its own separate universe, no interest if other people believe or not, but at the same time choose to share and to betray the terms of the joint report, click twice.
addition, because the lie has to have a course, can not help it that within the language shared by the group, which is within the so-called language-context that the liar shares with the speech community in which it is inserted [4] .
Just as it needs to share with other language-context, the liar makes it the least possible changes that should not be perceived as such by others. The principle underlying it is the "minimal effort": the lie because they must be strong and effective offense is never sensational, and every new lie is supported by previous lies embedded in the language-shared context.
Actually no speech act is the pure and simple repetition of something already fully contained in a shared language-context: every speech act involves at least a small change in a given context or aspect, the meaning of a word or expression, etc. .. So, ironically, the truthful mind getting a little 'as it brings only minor variations in language, shared context, contributing to its preservation, processing, and the liar is always a little' truthful because, by making changes to the language-context contributes the same way as truthful to its preservation-transformation [5] .
This does not mean that true and false are the same thing. Indeed
statement sarà definita di volta in volta veritiera o menzognera rispetto a certe condizioni fattuali che standardizzano il contesto-linguaggio di riferimento. Ad esempio, nel caso in cui, in uno scambio comunicativo, si sia verificata un’incertezza o uno scarto nella comunicazione, si fa di solito richiesta di un chiarimento, di una precisazione, che possa essere d’aiuto nel ricollegare l’origine del misunderstanding ad una menzogna o semplicemente ad un comportamento linguistico non convenzionale.
L’individuazione di una bugia, dunque, implica una lunga e problematica procedura di riformulazione, esplicitazione e di espansione del contesto volta ad appurare se le variazioni apportate al linguaggio-contesto vengono via via portate alla luce o sono, invece, ostinatamente presentate dal nostro mendace interlocutore come non-variazioni, come pure e semplici repliche del già condiviso.
In sostanza, il bugiardo si configura, oltre che come prototipo dell’uomo sociale, anche come un conservatore: egli non si ferma neanche di fronte all’evidenza, in quanto tenta di far passare come già previste le variazioni da lui apportate, pur essendo queste ultime delle variazioni palesemente finalizzate a portare fuori strada l’interlocutore.
È evidente che la procedura di riformulazione di cui si è detto non è che la specificazione di ciò che è l’intenzione del parlante.
L’idea di intenzionalità sembrerebbe fungere da vera e propria ultima condizione, presumibilmente anche sufficiente, della possibilità del veritiero e del menzognero.
Se si vuole analizzare a fondo il tema dell’intenzionalità, non si può non prendere in considerazione la riflessione filosofica di Sant’Agostino che, pur ricollegandosi a questioni più strettamente teologiche, ci offre comunque degli spunti interessanti.
Per Agostino non tutte le falsità sono menzogne: è mendax colui che vuole ingannare, indipendentemente dalla veridicità delle sue parole. Il male non è nell’errore, ma nell’intenzione di voler fare credere ciò che si ritiene un errore, non nell’ingannarsi ma nell’ingannare. Ovvero la menzogna non is similar to the error.
Therefore, to arrive at a clear definition of the lie must necessarily take into account the factor of intentionality.
"It's not a liar who tells lies, because they could be mistaken, you may joke, can lead one to believe the false to the truth: Who is a liar and double voluntas, who wants to fool expressing, in words or by other means, something different from what he believes true, with the clear intention to pass off the fake real. " You mind, then, only if there is going to lie. Besides, who minds, as St. Augustine, has a heart duplex, a double heart, because pensa una cosa diversa da quella che dice: «ha un pensiero della cosa che sa o ritiene vera e che non dice, un altro di quella che sa o ritiene essere falsa e che dice al posto del primo. Da ciò deriva che si possa dire il falso senza mentire […] e che si possa dire il vero mentendo […]. È dunque dall’intenzione dell’animo e non dalla verità o falsità delle cosa in sé che bisogna giudicare se uno mente o non mente» [6] .
Nella valutazione che Sant’Agostino fa della menzogna, dunque, si realizza il passaggio da uno schema diadico (basato sulla struttura mente-parola) ad uno schema triadico (basato sulla struttura mente-volontà-parola) [7] .
Garroni, indicates a very different position, which, however, stressed that the intentions of our actions, linguistic or otherwise, are ephemeral and unfathomable, and therefore apparently represent only a sufficient condition of the possibility of true and false.
intentions, in fact, are never so clear, in fact they are always a little 'ambiguous, often multiple, sometimes embedded one inside the other like Chinese boxes. For example, you may knowingly lie about aspects of an issue deemed to be insignificant, in the belief that they are intentionally truthful to the essentials, conversely, it can be for a while being truthful to our accuracy conditioned by an intention on the other misleading that tends to mislead the other party [8] .
These reflections, arising from observation of everyday reality, are also confirmed in the literary, as claimed Garroni 'understanding of lies have a relationship with the literary work in general. "
If we examine the liars in literature, in this case we are not facing a "going out that" we can read directly in the text.
In fact, apart from specifying the author all the real conditions for which a given lie is a lie, and even explicitly attributed to a character the intention of lying, the ambiguity and instability, which we previously referred, tend to persist [9] .
is true, in fact, that a character can be attributed intentions, but in reality he, as a character, not intentions, the author is simply a loan, often only in specific situations, not to stretch the overall context of the work .
ambiguity and lies, on the other hand, are essentially the inherent characteristics of the language: there seems reason to suspect that the lie is part of the talk itself. It is in this sense that we find the analogy between real and literary lie lie. Eco says: "There is no language where lies" [10] .
contrast, the literary lie differs from the real lie, as in the opera lacks the good will of the speakers "which allows, in fact, to limit and control the ambiguity just enough for the purposes of speaking and communicating. In reality, the procedures for drafting the context shall continue until such time as the speakers to reach an agreement and are satisfied, in a literary text that is not possible. This implies that if the character is a liar, he is in so far as it says and it is specified, no more than one measure: are not possible expansions of the language-context, that is ideally infinite integrations on the same level of literary description.
However, being a liar a liar, because of its limitations, characterization is never final and final interpretative: it is a liar, be suspended in its finite but open to interpretation ideally infinite. Although, for example, a character often said the way the lies of a liar for calling, it would be wrong or at least misleading to interpret it more as a liar.
a literary character, and the work to which it belongs, therefore, be regarded as a set of speech acts that require a language-context shared (ie the language-context of the writing of a certain type of work in a certain historical moment), which can be changed more or less deeply. Hence the opportunity to take a further analogy between literature and lying: they both have similar underlying mechanisms of operation.
But compared to lies and not-lie (which, as we saw in the course of this work, assume the truth conditions and a common problem of determining intent), occurs in the literary thing as a real lack of distinction between truth and untruthfulness. The literary work is both truthful and untruthful, and therefore not strictly truthful, properly or misleading. In it, simply, occurs and manifests itself in an exemplary manner the building, bedding and changing context of a language-. Conditions are those in the literary expression of the true mean lying and saying that in reality they are indescribable, the work itself is, indeed, the actual outcome (ie explicit) understanding (which is implied) by the author what is true / not true.
In this brief journey through the real and literary falsehood we have seen how the universal and necessary condition of mind is precisely the same time the condition of being universal and necessary veridici. L’opera letteraria non fa altro che mettere esplicitamente sotto i nostri occhi questa duplicità, che è la prova dell’esistenza di una vera e propria vocazione alla menzogna; come dice Garroni: «vivere, fare, esperimentare, parlare, conoscere, pensare è sempre qualcosa che oscilla tra veridicità e menzogna, tra l’avere-a-che-fare-con-qualcosa e il farlo-passare-per-qualcosa-d’altro» [11] .
«Niente di quello che ho detto è vero, non perché non sia vero ma perché l’ho detto [12] ,
e viceversa
niente di quello che ho detto è falso, not because it is false but because I said '
NOTES [1] In addition to liars, philosophers have more often dealt with the lie, which, in the literature, there are multiple taxonomies . We recall here those of St. Augustine and Jean Jacques Rousseau.
St. Augustine, the second part of De lies, the lies ranking based on their use and in decreasing order of severity:
1. Convert someone (and it is very serious lie in matters of faith);
2. Hurt tout court;
3. Enjoy deception;
4. As a favor to someone harming others;
5. Make a wish without harming anyone,
6. Revive the conversation;
7. Save a life;
8. Avoid someone to be an outrage unclean.
Jean Jacques Rousseau in his Confessions, classifies four types of lies:
1. The imposture, when you lie for personal gain;
2. Fraud, when you lie to the benefit of others;
3. Slander, when you lie with malicious intent;
4. The "white lie" when it is silent or deforms a thing of no use or do not bear any damage: it is pure fiction.
[2] See Oscar Wilde, The decay of lying, Mondadori, 1995, p. 41-42.
[3] emblem of this attitude toward life is the figure of Ulysses. During his wanderings around the Mediterranean, is ambiguous outlined an individual who does not lie just to save his life and that of his companions, as it might seem at first glance, but for the sake of lying. See Andrea Tagliapietra, Philosophy of the lie, Mondadori, 2001, pg. 126.
[4] The notion of language-context can be traced to the conception of language expressed by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations. According to the philosopher, in fact, the language, as it is actually used, is a set of expressions that perform different functions in different discursive practices and rules, created in relation to a set of circumstances that he describes as life forms, and it is an instrument of the life of a community.
[5] The concept of language-a dynamic context and is not describable in a net; Garroni says, "is precisely a center that is immersed in the endless suburbs of speaking generally, extending as far as the horizon and generating virtually infinite number of centers, which is related, also intersecting with countless other places, that is always willing to change from within, as well as integrated or stand out from other centers in new configurations. "
[6] See Augustine, De mendacity, III, 3.
[7] See Andrea Tagliapietra, Philosophy of lies, 2001, Bruno Mondadori, pp. 257-258.
[8] On the other hand, the same Garroni highlights the existence of a relationship between true / false and one true or not true to say: "In time you can be true and also lie in what are known or presumed to know that there is something like the truth. " There is therefore a need, a request for truth, which can not help neither truthful nor not truthful.
[9] As you know, the fact that it states that a liar is not without serious difficulties interpretation, as the ancient paradox of the liar, also known as the antinomy of Crete.
[10] "The language does not need to know a possible reality, but to brush, not to see her, knowing exactly where he is, even assuming that this fact is known beyond doubt." See Giorgio Manganelli, Literature as lies, 1985, Adelphi, p. 14.
The language may simply touch the reality, known in full only by thought. Literature is the most honest expression of artificiality of the language: it is aware of its limitations, and from the outset, it is proposed physiologically misleading.
[11] Emilio Garroni, "Observations on lying" in comments on the chin and other conferences, Tecla Editions, 1994, p. 39.
[12] Tommaso Landolfi, "The suit" in three stories, Vallecchi publisher, 1964.
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